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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff-Appellant is a former employee of the University of Idaho, who filed a 
Complaint against the Defendants-Respondents, the Board of Regents of the University ofIdaho, 
and the University of Idaho ("University of Idaho" and/or the "University"), alleging four causes 
of action (1) age discrimination and hostile work environment under state law (the Idaho Human 
Rights Act); (2) unlawful retaliation under state law (the Idaho Human Rights Act); (3) 
constructive discharge; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
In summary, the disputed and undisputed factual support for Ms. Hatheway's Complaint 
and claims, as provided for in the evidence and record submitted (citations to the record for facts 
not already provided in the Appellant's Brief are included herewith), includes but is not limited 
to the following summation: 
A. Initially during the first six years of her employment, Ms. Hatheway was always 
viewed as an "outstanding" employee in her job as an Administrative Assistant II in the English 
Department. Ms. Hatheway routinely received the best possible scores on her annual 
evaluations. Some of the comments made about Ms. Hatheway in those evaluations were that 
"Lillian is one of the best things to happen to the English Department in a long time," that Lillian 
was a "great team player," and how "it would be a great loss should she [Ms. Hatheway] ever 
leave [the Department of English]." In fact, Ms. Hatheway was even nominated for employee of 
the year at the University by a professor in the department who stated that "Lillian is the 
administrative heart of the Department of English. Her skills and warmth are essential to the 
well-being of our faculty and students." (These facts are undisputed.) 
B. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that other than the individuals from the 
University opposing Ms. Hatheway's claims (her former supervisor Dr. Olsson), no University 
of Idaho employee has ever called into question Ms. Hatheway's honesty, truthfulness or 
veracity. (These facts are also undisputed.) 
C. In 2005, Ms. Hatheway's supervisor, the chair of the English Department, 
changed to Dr. Kurt Olsson. Thereafter in 2005, Dr. Olsson hired Ms. Deborah Allen for the 
position of Financial Technician to the Department of English. At the time of her hire, Ms. Allen 
was approximately forty-seven (47) years-old, and Ms. Hatheway was approximately sixty-two 
(62) years-old (Ms. Hatheway'S date of birth is ). Although Ms. Hatheway 
had an identical pay grade with Ms. Allen, a higher Hay Point rating (the University's policy and 
procedure on establishing pay grades for classified employees), and a longer tenure at the 
University than Ms. Allen, Dr. Olsson provided Ms. Allen with a higher hourly rate of pay than 
what Ms. Hatheway was receiving at that time. (These facts are undisputed.) 
D. Ms. Hatheway made several complaints to Dr. Olsson and other University of 
Idaho officials regarding the pay rate differential between her and what Dr. Olsson had provided 
to Ms. Allen, which Ms. Hatheway asserted was age discrimination. (The fact that Ms. 
Hatheway made complaints about the pay rate differential is undisputed; however, it is a genuine 
disputed issue of material fact whether Ms. Hatheway expressed her belief that the wage rate 
differential provided to Ms. Allen by Dr. Olsson was age discrimination.) Regardless, after Ms. 
Hatheway's verbal complaints on the issue, Dr. Olsson, citing his authority to "weigh" pay issues 
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and his "equity" powers on the subject, did not alter Ms. Allen or Ms. Hatheway's then current 
wage rates. (This fact is undisputed.) 
E. One month after receiving the nomination for University employee of the year, on 
May 1, 2006, former University of Idaho President, Mr. Timothy P. White, gave a State of the 
University Address. During his speech, President White stated that older University employees 
needed to "get out of the way" and "retire" to help the University recruit "young entry-level" 
individuals, and that he was going to discuss his new University policy of getting rid of the older 
workers with the University administrators. (President White's speech and the statements he 
made therein are undisputed.) 
F. It is undisputed that after Ms. Hatheway'S complaints about her perceived belief 
of age discrimination in the wage rate differential between herself and Ms. Allen, and the 
President's speech about older workers retiring and the University bringing in young entry-level 
individuals, everything changed for Ms. Hatheway in her employment. The reason why Ms. 
Hatheway's employment changed is a genuine disputed issue of material fact. Shortly thereafter, 
Dr. Kurt Olsson's (Dr. Olsson was the Chair of the Department of English and Ms. Hatheway'S 
direct supervisor) attitude and supervision of Ms. Hatheway turned cold and negative. (This is 
also a genuine disputed issue of material fact.) Dr. Olsson began isolating Ms. Hatheway and 
removing some of her key employment duties and responsibilities. It is undisputed that Dr. 
Olsson and/or the University of Idaho "shifted" some of Ms. Hatheway'S responsibilities away 
from her, and that some of her duties and functions as an Administrative Assistant II for Dr. 
Olsson "lessened over time." 
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G. Then, only five months after President White's speech, Ms. Hatheway's 
supervisor, Dr. Olsson, made comments during a faculty meeting that he would only consider 
"young" employees for a new position within the Department of English, and affirmatively 
rebuked the idea of hiring a qualified older worker for the position. (The faculty meeting in 
question and the new position discussed therein are undisputed facts; however, the statements 
made during the faculty meeting attributed to Dr. Olsson are genuine disputed issues of material 
facts.) While Ms. Hatheway was not present at this meeting, Ms. Hatheway was informed of the 
ageist remarks made by Dr. Olsson by an un-biased, third party witness who was present at the 
meeting, and who has provided the same sworn deposition testimony and evidence in this case. 
Ms. Hatheway eventually confronted Dr. Olsson regarding his ageist comments, and Dr. Olsson 
admitted to Ms. Hatheway that he made the comment. (This is a genuine disputed issue of 
material fact; however, it is undisputed that the person ultimately hired for the new position by 
Dr. Olsson was thirty-six (36) year-old Brandon Schrand.) 
H. A few months later, Ms. Hatheway, who never had received any negative marks, 
write-ups or warnings concerning her employment before, suddenly received an annual 
evaluation from Dr. Olsson wherein he deemed that she "need[ ed] improvement" III her 
employment. The result of this negative and poor annual evaluation was that it made Ms. 
Hatheway ineligible for an automatic pay raise. (These facts are undisputed.) 
I. Furthermore, at the same time Ms. Hatheway received her second annual 
performance evaluation from Dr. Olsson, she was provided a Performance Development Plan 
("PDP") by Dr. Olsson indicating that it, coupled with the PDP, was a "final" warning and 
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further instances would provide for discipline. (These facts are undisputed; however, the 
University of Idaho disputes that the PDP was "disciplinary in any way.") Yet, aside from the 
fact that Dr. Olsson stated that the PDP together with the evaluation was a "final" warning, the 
authority for using a PDP for a classified employee is listed in the University of Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Manual, 50.21 - entitled "Documenting and Addressing 
Unsatisfactory Performance of Classified Staff." This policy/procedure states in relevant part 
that: "[a]ny UI classified employee who receives an overall rating of unsatisfactory or needs 
improvement as a result of performance evaluation [Ms. Hatheway's facts] may be placed in a 
petformance-related probationary status that lasts for ninety (90) days." Section C-l of 
policy/procedure 50.21, detailing the required documentation that is necessary for performance-
related probation, is the only University policy wherein a PDP is discussed. (R. Vol. III. P. 518, 
L.15-17, pp. 572-573) (The University's stated policies and procedures are undisputed.) 
1. As a result of her beliefs that her poor annual employment review and the PDP 
from Dr. Olsson were due to age discrimination by Dr. Olsson, Ms. Hatheway filed a University 
of Idaho Problem Solving Request, a complaint to the University of Idaho Human Rights 
Compliance Officer, and a complaint to the Idaho Human Rights Commission. The filing of 
these complaints is undisputed. Shortly after filing the complaints, Ms. Hatheway overheard Dr. 
Olsson indicate that he was going to "replace" Ms. Hatheway, that he had her under "continued 
surveillance" and how he was watching "evidently [her] every move." In addition, Ms. 
Hatheway was also then asked by one of Dr. Olsson's close advisers, Ms. Deb Allen, when she, 
Ms. Hatheway, was going to "retire." (These are genuine disputed issues of material facts.) 
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K. In April of2008, eight (8) months after filing her Idaho Human Rights Complaint, 
and while she had been continued to be isolated and had her job duties stripped by Dr. Olson, 
Ms. Hatheway received another poor, negative, annual performance evaluation from the 
University. (This is an undisputed fact.) Ms. Hatheway again received a score indicating that 
she was an employee who "need[ed] improvement" and again was disqualified for an automatic 
pay raise. (This is an undisputed fact.) After complaining again about the false evaluation and 
proving that the objective criteria used against her concerning her attendance was false, the 
University corrected Ms. Hatheway's pay for that year and did provide some form of raise. (This 
is an undisputed fact.) 
L. By the summer of 2008, Ms. Hatheway's began to suffer from bodily, mental and 
emotional effects from the continual hostility, isolation, false accusations of employment 
misconduct, and discrimination. Eventually, Ms. Hatheway was forced to seek medical 
treatment. Her physician assessed Ms. Hatheway with dizziness, high blood pressure, and 
anxiety due to her work stresses. Ms. Hatheway's physician then took her off of work for a 
period of time, and placed Ms. Hatheway on medication. (Ms. Hatheway's medical treatments 
are undisputed facts.) 
M. Ultimately, due to her work caused medical symptoms and the intolerable 
working conditions, Ms. Hatheway was forced to prematurely retire from the University of Idaho 
on September 12, 2008. (It is an undisputed fact that Ms. Hatheway resigned from the 
University of Idaho on that date.) At the time of her forced retirement, Ms. Hatheway had 
planned on working for the University for at least another two more years. 
6 
N. 
Hatheway. 
After her constructive discharge, Dr. Olsson quickly hired a replacement for Ms. 
Ms. Hatheway's replacement was a thirty-two (32) year old individual. 
Furthermore, Dr. Olsson gave that individual a higher starting salary than Ms. Hatheway had at 
the end of her employment tenure with the University ofIdaho. (These facts are undisputed.) 
Despite the above facts and evidence presented in response to the University's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, on August 18, 2011, the University of Idaho moved for complete summary 
judgment on all of Ms. Hatheway'S claims. In refuting some, but not all, of above facts and 
evidence supporting Ms. Hatheway's claims, the boiled down defense and basis for the 
University's motion for summary judgment was that Ms. Hatheway was simply disgruntled at 
Dr. Olsson for providing another employee a higher wage, and that Ms. Hatheway allowed her 
discontent to develop into a negative attitude and behavior. Regardless, while some of the facts 
and events provided above may be disputed by the University, all are supported by the affidavits 
and evidence provided by Ms. Hatheway (and the University) filed in the summary judgment 
proceedings. Further, when the disputed facts and evidence are construed liberally, viewed in 
the light most favorabe to the non-moving party, Ms. Hatheway, and without making credibility 
determinations, had offered the sufficient foundation to which required denial of the University's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Nonetheless, on November 10, 2011, District Court Judge Jeff M. Brudie granted the 
University of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment, entered judgment on December 15,2011, 
and dismissed all of Ms. Hatheway's claims. 
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Upon review of the District Court's Opinion and Order, it is clear that instead of applying 
the proper standards of review for an employment discrimination case at the summary judgment 
stage, the District Court gave all inferences to the moving party, the University; accepted all of 
the University's testimony as true for the purposes of its motion; did not accept Ms. Hatheway's 
testimony as true for purposes of the non-moving party; did not accept Ms. Hatheway'S 
supporting witness testimony as true for purposes of the motion; and provided no reasonable 
inferences in favor of Ms. Hatheway. 
As a result of the District Court's errors, on December 21, 2011, Ms. Hatheway appealed 
the District Court's grant of the University of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment. In its 
Respondents' Brief, the University of Idaho has misstated certain disputed and undisputed 
material facts, again misstated the proper legal analysis on its Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and provided misleading case law on the issues presented. As a result, this Reply Brief includes 
rebuttal arguments to the contentions of the University of Idaho, and analysis and citation to 
proper case law for the Idaho Supreme Court's consideration on her appeal.! The evidence and 
law provided herein confirms that the Idaho Supreme Court should find that Ms. Hatheway has 
presented direct evidence and indirect circumstantial evidence of age discrimination, hostile 
work environment, retaliation, constructive discharge, and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, and that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment on 
! The course of the proceedings in the hearing at the district court level and its disposition, a concise statement of the 
facts, the issues presented on appeal, and Appellants' claim for attorney fees on appeal have were provided for 
comprehensively in the Appellant's Brief, and will not be re-addressed herein. 
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all of Ms. Hatheway's claims. Ms. Hatheway is requesting that the Idaho Supreme Court reverse 
and vacate the summary judgment order, and remand the case for trial on all of her claims. 
II. REPL Y ARGUMENT 
A. The University of Idaho incorrectly states the evidentiary standard of review 
and burden of proof regarding Ms. Hatheway's Age Discrimination and 
Constructive Discharge claims on summary judgment. 
In support of its erroneous argument that the District Court was correct in granting 
summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's age discrimination, constructive discharge, hostile work 
environment, retaliation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, the University of 
Idaho makes one global argument: it claims that as a matter of law, Ms. Hatheway cannot meet 
the third element of her prima facie case, i.e. that Ms. Hatheway was discharged (including 
constructive discharge) or that her employer took adverse employment actions against her. This 
is the same element of the prima facie case that the District Court found dispositive in its 
Opinion and Order on the University's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The University's argument is essentially that while they admit that Ms. Hatheway did in 
fact suffer adverse employment actions, Ms. Hatheway, in response to the University'S Motion 
for Summary Judgment, "must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [her] age was the 
"but-for" cause of the challenged adverse employment actions," citing Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) and Waterman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667 
(2009) ("Ms. Hatheway bears the burden of proving that her age actually played a role in U of 
I's decision-making process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.") (Resp.'s Brief, 
pp. 20-22 (emphasis added)) 
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However, contrary to the University's position, neither Gross nor Waterman involved 
review of summary judgments and they do not provide the proper burden of proof. Gross 
involved the issue of whether a mixed-motives instruction may be given to the jury in an ADEA 
case. In pointing this fact out, the Ninth Circuit Court has stated, in regards to Gross, that: 
[bjecause Gross involved a case that had already progressed to trial, it did 
not address the evidentiary framework applicable to a motion for summary 
judgment. The Court, in fact, explicitly noted that it "has not definitively 
decided whether the evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas utilized in 
Title VII cases is appropriate in the ADEA context." Gross, at 2349 n. 2. 
Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). 
Moreover Waterman involved the issue of a district court's grant of a directed verdict and 
the Idaho Supreme Court's review thereof. That is, in Waterman, the Idaho Supreme Court 
reviewed whether the plaintiff proved at trial through his evidence the elements of his ADEA 
claim. The Court examined whether Waterman, the plaintiff, "was discharged or Respondent 
took adverse employment action against him ... there is no substantial evidence in the record that 
Appellant was constructively discharged or that Respondent took adverse employment action 
against him". Waterman, 146 Idaho at 672-673. 
While it is true that "to prevail on a claim for age discrimination ... a plaintiff must prove 
at trial that age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's adverse action" (Shelley, 666 F.3d at 
607), citing Gross,129 S.Ct. at 2350), this is not the proper evidentiary standard on a summary 
judgment, and does not apply here to properly analyze the evidentiary framework of the 
University's summary judgment. 
lO 
The proper standard and evidentiary burden of proof to evaluate Ms. Hatheway'S age 
discrimination claims is that Ms. Hatheway must establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination by providing evidence that: (1) she is at least 40 years of age; (2) she was 
qualified for her position and performing her job in a satisfactory manner; (3) she was discharged 
(including constructive discharge) or her employer took adverse employment actions against her; 
and (4) her position was filled by a younger person of equal or less qualifications. Wallis v. l.R. 
Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994). On this appeal, the first, second, and fourth elements 
of the prima facie case are not in dispute (i.e. Ms. Hatheway has established them). 
If Ms. Hatheway is successful with establishing a prima facie case based on direct 
evidence of age discrimination, then she has necessarily survived summary judgment, the 
"McDonnell Douglas" burden shifting analysis is not applied, and there is no review of the 
University's proffered non-discriminatory reasons for its adverse employment actions. See ~ 
Goodwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998) (when the plaintiff offers 
direct evidence of discriminatory motive, a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the 
employer is created even if the evidence is not substantial); see also Lindahl v. Air France, 930 
F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1991); Wallis, 26 F.3d 885; Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Schnidrig v. Colum. Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406 (9th Cir. 1996); Sischo-Nownejad v. 
Merced Cmty. ColI. Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1991); Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab 
Co., Inc., 389 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Only, if Ms. Hatheway were to have failed to present direct evidence to support her 
disparate treatment claim and instead based her prima facie case on the presumptions arising 
II 
from indirect circumstantial evidence, would the Idaho Supreme Court apply the "McDonnell 
Douglas" burden-shifting analysis. Enlow, 389 F.3d 802; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). As provided in Appellant's Brief, the Ninth Circuit has held 
that nothing in Gross overruled cases utilizing the McDonnell Douglas framework to decide 
summary judgment motions in age discrimination cases wherein there was no direct evidence to 
establish the prima facie case.2,3 
Generally, under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, if a plaintiff 
establishes her prima facie case through indirect circumstantial evidence, the burden of 
production shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its 
adverse employment actions. It is then the plaintiffs task to demonstrate that there are material 
genuine issues of fact as to whether the employer's purported reasons are pretext for age 
discrimination. If, so the plaintiff has survived summary judgment, and ultimately then, at trial, 
2 The Ninth Circuit Court in Shelley provided that [b ]ecause the continued use of McDonnell Douglas in summary 
judgment motions on ADEA claims is not inconsistent with Gross, it could not overrule prior precedent because of 
Gross. Shelley, 666 F.3d at 607-08. 
3 The Ninth Circuit Court in Shelley also explained the McDonnell Douglas test, which is only used on summary 
judgment, and not at trial, as: "[t ]he McDonnell Douglas test shifts only the burden of production, after the plaintiff 
makes a prima facie case. See, ~, Tusing v. Des Moines Cmty. Sch. Dist., 639 F.3d 507, 515 n. 3 (8th Cir.20II) 
("The McDonnell Douglas analysis is likely still an appropriate way to analyze ADEA 'pretext' claims, however, 
because McDonnell Douglas only shifts the burden of production."); Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684,691 
(3d Cir.2009) ("Gross stands for the proposition that it is improper to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant 
in an age discrimination case. McDonnell Douglas, however, imposes no shift in that particular burden."). "If 
plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, '[t]he burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer to 
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions.' " Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 
615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir.20IO) (quoting Chuang v. Vniv. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 
(9th Cir.2000». "If defendant meets this burden, plaintiffs must then raise a triable issue of material fact as to 
whether the defendant's proffered reasons for their terminations are mere pretext for unlawful discrimination." Id. 
Shelley, 666 F.3d at 607-08. 
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in accordance with Gross and Waterman, she must carry the burden to prove that age was the 
"but-for" cause of her adverse employment actions and constructive discharge. 
The reason for the lesser evidentiary burden of proof standard on summary judgment in 
discrimination cases is best stated by the Ninth Circuit Court in the case McGinest v. GTE Servo 
Corp., 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). In McGinest, the Ninth Circuit, quoting in part the U.S. 
Supreme Court, concisely said: 
[i]n In evaluating motions for summary judgment in the context of 
employment discrimination, we have emphasized the importance of 
zealously guarding an employee's right to a full trial, since discrimination 
claims are frequently difficult to prove without a full airing of the evidence 
and an opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. See, ~, 
Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1410-11; Lam, 40 F.3d at 1563; Sischo-Nownejad., 934 
F.2d at 1111. As the Supreme Court has stated, "The real social impact of 
workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured 
by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed." 
Oncale V. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82, 118 S.Ct. 
998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). As a result, when a court too readily grants 
summary judgment, it runs the risk of providing a protective shield for 
discriminatory behavior that our society has determined must be extirpated. 
McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1112. Here, as outlined below, Ms. Hatheway presented direct evidence 
to defeat summary judgment, and the University improperly relies on the incorrect use of 
"McDonnell Douglas," which is inapplicable here. 
II 
II 
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B. Ms. Hatheway has presented direct evidence of the University's age 
discriminatory motive and/or bias with her prima facie case, including that she 
suffered adverse employment actions and/or was constructively discharged, 
which necessarily precluded summary judgment regardless of the University's 
alleged non-discriminatory reasons. 
As provided for in Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hatheway has brought forth direct evidence 
which, when viewed in the light most favorably to her, and without making credibility 
determinations at this stage, creates genuine issues of material fact that Ms. Hatheway did suffer 
adverse employment actions, was constructively discharged, and that but-for Ms. Hatheway's 
age, she would not have suffered those adverse employment actions and/or constructive 
discharge. This issue has already been thoroughly addressed in the Appellant's Brief, and will 
not be re-discussed herein. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the University of Idaho admits several times in its 
response brief that Ms. Hatheway did in fact suffer adverse employment actions. For example, 
in Respondents' Brief, in its Statement of Facts, the University admitted that it "shift[ed] tasks" 
of Ms. Hatheway to others, that "Dr. Olsson sometimes performed [Ms. Hatheway's] clerical 
tasks," and that some "duties" of Ms. Hatheway's job "lessened over time." (Resp.'s Brief, pg. 
14). Then, later in its Brief the University cites to the case Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 160 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998) for the proposition that "shunning" is not an adverse 
employment action unless a plaintiff shows that "ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, 
seniority, or responsibilities." (Resp.'s Brief, pg. 28 (emphasis added).) The University'S 
admissions of fact of Ms. Hatheway's reduced responsibilities, along with this case cite, together 
with the admissions of the other prima facie elements to Ms. Hatheway'S age discrimination 
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claims, and the direct evidence of age biased motive, are alone enough to survIve summary 
judgment. It is for ajury to determine the question of fact as to whether but-for Ms. Hatheway's 
age, would she have suffered these adverse employment actions. It was in error for the District 
Court judge to determine this factual issue on summary judgment, and his Opinion and Order 
should be reversed. 
C. Even assuming that Ms. Hatheway relies on indirect circumstantial evidence of 
adverse employment actions, Ms. Hatheway's pay differential, and the ageist 
comments made by the University, create genuine issues of material facts which 
prohibit summary judgment. 
1. Indirect and circumstantial evidence create triable issues of material fact 
as to whether the University of Idaho's alleged non-discriminatory 
reasons for the hourly wage disparity between Ms. Hatheway and Ms. 
Allen were really a pretext to age discrimination. 
To support its fallacious argument that Ms. Hatheway's age discrimination and 
constructive discharge claims fail as a matter of law because Ms. Hatheway cannot "prove" at 
the summary judgment stage that she was constructively discharged4 or that the University took 
adverse employment action against her, the University set forth its alleged non-discriminatory 
reasons behind the hourly wage difference between Ms. Hatheway and Ms. Allen. 5 The 
4 The University asserts this even though a determination of constructive discharge is normally a factual question 
left to the trier offact. Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007); Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 
F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir.1987). 
5 It is apparent that the University has ignored, and failed to address and/or respond to any of the other adverse 
employment actions Ms. Hatheway suffered to support her claims of age discrimination (such as significantly 
reduced responsibilities, receiving poor performance evaluations, receiving a performance development plan which 
placed her on probation, the lack of an automatic state pay raise, and being ostracized in the workplace by the use of 
isolation, lack of communications, changing her work area without her notice, and failing to follow-up on required 
meetings). As a result, Ms. Hatheway stands on the evidence in the record and briefing already filed, and will not 
here provide duplicative argument regarding triable issues of material fact as to whether the defendant's proffered 
reasons for these other adverse employment actions are mere pretext for unlawful age discrimination. 
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University's principal defense to that specific adverse employment action is to proffer (step two 
in the McDonnell Douglas test) three arguments: (1) Ms. Hatheway points to no internal rule or 
regulation of the University that would have required Ms. Hatheway to receive the same salary 
and Dr. Olsson had the ability to weigh issues with his equitable powers in determining wages; 
(2) Ms. Hatheway fails to present statistical evidence regarding the compensation of other older 
employees at the University; and (3) Ms. Allen herself was 47 years old and within the protected 
class at the time of her hire, so Ms. Hatheway's claim is unfounded. Based on those arguments, 
the University contends that Ms. Hatheway has not proven at the summary judgment stage that 
her age played a role in Dr. Olsson's decision to pay Ms. Allen a higher hourly wage than Ms. 
Hatheway received from Dr. Olsson and the University. Ms. Hatheway will address each of the 
University's arguments on this issue in sequential order. 
First, the University is patently wrong on its factual allegation that Ms. Hatheway "points 
to no internal rule or regulation of the U of I that would have required Ms. Hatheway to receive 
the same salary." (Resp. 's Brief, pg. 22) Ms. Hatheway testified and produced evidence 
regarding the "Hay Point" pay rating system used at the University of Idaho. This is the internal 
rule or regulation that the University uses to determine pay grades for job classifications. Ms. 
Hatheway, whose job required knowledge and interpretation of University policies and 
procedures, testified to this fact. The University never disputed Ms. Hatheway'S characterization 
of this University Policy or Procedure in response to Ms. Hatheway'S testimony. Therefore, it is 
an undisputed fact. Further, whether Dr. Olsson did in fact have equitable powers to weigh and 
determine Ms. Allen's hourly rate of pay (which is disputed) is irrelevant to Ms. Hatheway'S age 
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discrimination claims since that would be wholly subjective on his part, and is countered by the 
direct and circumstantial evidence produced by Ms. Hatheway of Dr. Olsson's age bias motive 
(which is discussed in greater detail below). 
As a result, based on the University's Hay Point policy and procedure, the reality is that 
the evidence produced in response to the University's Motion for Summary Judgment 
demonstrated that Ms. Allen, a forty-seven year old individual, received from Dr. Olsson a 
higher starting hourly wage than Ms. Hatheway, a sixty-two year-old individual (the relevance of 
the age difference between Ms. Hatheway and Ms. Allen is also discussed in greater detail 
below). Ms. Allen received a higher hourly wage than Ms. Hatheway despite the undisputed 
evidence that Ms. Hatheway and Ms. Allen's position were in the identical pay grades, Ms. 
Hatheway's job had a higher "Hay Point" rating, and Ms. Hatheway had a longer tenure at the 
University ofIdaho. These undisputed facts create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the University discriminated against Ms. Hatheway in regards to her compensation because of, or 
on the basis of, her age. This therefore precludes summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway'S age 
discrimination claims. 
And contrary to the University's second argument that Ms. Hatheway has failed to 
provide statistical evidence to support her claim of age discrimination regarding the adverse 
employment action of her pay discrepancy with Ms. Allen's, Ms. Hatheway affirmatively 
admitted in her Memorandum in Response to the University's Motion for Summary Judgment 
that she is not alleging unintentional discrimination (generally referred to as a disparate impact 
discrimination claim). An unintentional discrimination claim is where statistical evidence is 
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commonly used. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, (1993); Katz v. Regents of the 
University of California, 229 F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Hemmings v. Tidyman's 
Inc., 285 F .3d 1174, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing statistical evidence in favor of plaintiff s 
disparate impact case). Instead, Ms. Hatheway is alleging, with proof of direct and indirect 
circumstantial evidence, that Ms. Hatheway was subjected to intentional age discrimination by 
the University and constructively discharged; therefore, statistical evidence is not needed and 
this response argument by the University is irrelevant. 
Third, the undisputed fact that Ms. Allen was over forty (40) years-old at the time of the 
adverse employment action is, for all intents and purposes, immaterial. The material issue 
regarding Ms. Allen's age, as case law dictates, is the age gap and/or age difference between Ms. 
Hatheway and Ms. Allen at the time of the alleged adverse employment action. The undisputed 
evidence establishes that Ms. Allen and Ms. Hatheway's age difference is fifteen (15) years. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the prima facie case is focused on whether 
the person within the protected class (over 40 years of age) was discriminated against on the 
basis of age, not on whether the age discrimination plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the 
protected class (younger than 40 years of age). O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 
517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996). Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that whether "a replacement is 
substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than 
is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class." O'Connor, 
517 U.S. at 313. In regards to the "substantially younger" language of O'Connor, generally, 
courts have held that a 10-year difference in ages between the plaintiff and the comparator 
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individual is presumptively substantial. See ~ Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 
1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008), citing Hartley v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir.1997) 
(holding that replacement employees must be at least ten years younger than their predecessors 
to justify a presumption of age discrimination). 
Consequently, in this case, on solely the issue of the adverse employment action of Ms. 
Hatheway'S pay differential with Ms. Allen's (not even including the hiring by Dr. Olsson of 
Brandon Schrand who was 36, and Ms. Hatheway'S replacement, Ms. Carmen who was 32), Ms. 
Hatheway was fifteen years older than Ms. Allen. That "substantial" age difference is enough to 
create an age discrimination presumption to survive summary judgment on that adverse 
employment action of Ms. Hatheway'S age discrimination claims. 
Lastly, while not relevant to the issue of the adverse employment action of Ms. 
Hatheway'S and Ms. Allen's pay difference, the University includes in this section of its 
response argument the disputed factual issue concerning the discussions Ms. Hatheway had with 
Professor Robert Wrigley. The University includes the disputed facts of these discussions to 
assert (presumably as a proffered non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment actions) 
that "Ms. Hatheway negatively impacted the Department's ability to engage in as a cohesive and 
supportive team." (Resp.'s Brief, pg. 24) 
In reply to this false statement with undisputed facts, Dr. Robert Wrigley, who at that 
time was the Director of Creative Writing for the University (and whose supervisor was also Dr. 
Olsson), was the only professor who actually made any negative remarks about Ms. Hatheway in 
the area of teamwork on her second poor performance evaluation. (R. Vol. II, pp. 321, 450) 
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Despite the mis-characterization of this issue in the Respondents' Brief, Dr. Wrigley testified 
that Ms. Hatheway "was always someone tremendously cordial, tremendously friendly, 
extremely nurturing." (R. Vol. II, pp. 454, 466-468) Further, when questioned about the 
instances of Ms. Hatheway coming to him during his deposition, Dr. Wrigley testified that he 
understood that Ms. Hatheway considered him a professional friend in the department, that he 
may have seemed like a safe place to come to. (R. Vol. II, p. 456) 
In testifying about the conversations themselves, Dr. Wrigley stated that the 
conversations lasted for only "two, three minutes maybe." (R. Vol. II, p. 460) He stated that 
Ms. Hatheway appeared "flushed" and that he "knew she was upset when she walked in the 
door." (R. Vol. II, p. 462) When discussing the words Ms. Hatheway used in these 
conversations, Dr. Wrigley testified that Ms. Hatheway did not use foul language or any type of 
threatening language. (R. Vol. II, p. 463) He also testified that he never witnessed Ms. 
Hatheway not work well with others, not be supportive to other co-workers, or be unprofessional 
to anyone in the office. (R. Vol. II, pp.461- 462) He further stated that on the second instance 
where Ms. Hatheway came to him, he gently told her that he could not do anything about it and 
that it would be more appropriate for her to take them somewhere else. After Dr. Wrigley let 
Ms. Hatheway know that he could not remedy her concerns, Dr. Wrigley confirms that Ms. 
Hatheway did not come back to him with her concerns. Dr. Wrigley states that "I think it was 
very appropriate. She [Ms. Hatheway] behaved appropriately" in that regard. (R. Vol. II, pp. 
455,457-458) 
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Based on the above testimony, it is clear that Dr. Wrigley's testimony creates a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether the University's proffered non-discriminatory reason for its 
adverse employment actions (i.e. that Ms. Hatheway allegedly negatively impacted the 
Department's ability to engage as a cohesive and supportive team), is in reality a pretext to age 
discrimination. This is especially true when one considers that Dr. Olsson himself admitted that 
Ms. Allen routinely came to him with complaints regarding Ms. Hatheway, and that Dr. Olsson 
never considered Ms. Allen's complaints about Ms. Hatheway as negatively impacting the 
Department's ability to engage as a cohesive and supportive team. 
2. The direct, indirect, and circumstantial evidence of the ageist comments 
made by the University of Idaho create triable issues of material fact as to 
whether the University of Idaho's alleged non-discriminatory reasons for 
its adverse employment actions taken against Ms. Hatheway were really a 
pretext to age discrimination. 
As part of Ms. Hatheway's direct evidence of age discriminatory ammus of the 
University ofIdaho, Ms. Hatheway produced evidence of ageist comments from two University 
officials, Ms. Hatheway's supervisor, Dr. Olsson, and former University of Idaho President, 
Timothy P. White (including other age-related comments from University employees such as 
Ms. Allen). In addition to the direct evidence nature of the ageist comments in this case, the 
comments also provided indirect circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the University's proffered alleged non-discriminatory reasons for its adverse 
employment actions taken against Ms. Hatheway were in fact a pretext to age discrimination.6 
6 The temporal connection to the adverse employment actions, the context of the ageist statements, and the identity 
of the ageist comments also establish genuine issues of material fact as to the nexus and/or causal connection of Ms. 
Hatheway'S hostile work environment and retaliation claims, which is discussed in greater detail below. 
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The circumstantial nature of the ageist comments (including by, but not limited to the temporal 
connection, context, and identity of the speakers in relation to the adverse employment actions) 
was extensively briefed in the Appellant's Brief and will not be re-addressed herein for the sake 
of brevity. 
However, in response to Ms. Hatheway's citation to the ageist comments evidenced in 
her Appellant's Brief, the University responded with three different arguments: (1) Dr. Olsson 
allegedly never attended any of President White's State of the University addresses and has no 
recollection of their contents; (2) other employees of the Department of English were in their 
sixties, and Dr. Olsson is of similar age to Ms. Hatheway; and (3) even if the ageist statements 
are true, they do not support an inference of age discrimination because they were "stray 
remarks" not related to Ms. Hatheway's employment. The University ultimately uses these three 
arguments in this section of its response brief to contend that Ms. Hatheway's age discrimination 
and constructive discharge claims fail as a matter of law because she cannot "prove" at the 
summary judgment stage that she was constructively discharged or suffered adverse employment 
actions because of her age. None of these arguments factually or legally establish that summary 
judgment was properly granted. 
Addressing the University's first argument in response to President White's undisputed 
ageist comments, it is illogical and unbelievable to accept that Dr. Olsson, an administrator and 
Department Chair of the University, would not attend, listen, or at least read a copy of the 
University President's speech (which was produced in written form on the University's website 
after) concerning the state of the University. Moreover, as provided in Appellant' Brief, the 
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circumstantial evidence regarding context and timing of President White's speech with the start 
of the adverse employment actions suffered by Ms. Hatheway (temporal connection) gives 
credence to the indirect circumstantial evidence that they were not stray remarks, and that Dr. 
Olsson did in fact hear them. Relying on such evidence in reality makes an inference, which is 
properly given to the non-moving party, Ms. Hatheway, on summary judgment. 
Nonetheless, even assuming the unlikely premise that Dr. Olsson did not hear President 
White's ageist comments, the remarks made by President White were made as a speaking agent 
and decisions-maker for the University of Idaho, the Defendant in this case. Dr. Olsson is not a 
defendant in this case, but was also acting as an agent and decisionmaker for the University of 
Idaho when he made his age biased comments. As a result, regardless of whether Dr. Olsson 
heard President White's clearly age discriminatory speech, President White's undisputed 
comments were not stray, and do provide indirect circumstantial evidence to create a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether the University's alleged non-discriminatory reasons for Ms. 
Hatheway's adverse employment actions were merely a pretext to age discrimination. 
Next, the University's argument that the age of the decision-maker/supervisor, Dr. 
Olsson, and the ages of the professors in the Department of English, are close to that of Ms. 
Hatheway's is completely irrelevant to the analysis of whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding whether the adverse employment actions were taken against Ms. 
Hatheway, an administrative assistant, because of Ms. Hatheway's age. The irrelevance of this 
evidence is highlighted by the fact that the University cites to no case law and/or legal authority 
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to support its proposition that the older age of the alleged decisionmaker in an age discrimination 
case is material in any way to an individual's age discrimination claim on summary judgment. 
Moreover, the University makes this argument despite the evidence that the only three 
people hired by Dr. Olsson during the relevant time period (the relevant comparators) were 
Deborah Allen, who was fifteen years younger than Ms. Hatheway, Brandon Schrand, who was 
thirty-six years old at the time of his hire, and Ms. Carmen (Ms. Hatheway's replacement), who 
was thirty-two years old at the time of her hire. These three hires (coupled with the other 
adverse employment actions suffered by Ms. Hatheway) actually go to support the indirect 
circumstantial evidence that Dr. Olsson did in fact hear and carry out President White's State of 
the University Address instructions to University administrators (which includes Dr. Olsson) to 
"get [older workers] out of the way" and bring in "young entry-level" individuals. Further, 
President White's comments are uncannily similar to those Dr. Olsson made shortly after 
President White's speech, when Dr. Olsson stated he would only consider potential employees 
who were "young and energetic," and would not consider an "older" employee candidate. 
Lastly, the University argues that Ms. Hatheway'S age discrimination and constructive 
discharge claims fail as a matter of law because, even assuming the ageist comments of Dr. 
Olsson produced by Ms. Hatheway were true, those comments fall under the "stray remarks 
doctrine" in Waterman and Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1990), and 
do not support an inference to survive summary judgment. 
While biased comments by non-decisionmakers which are not temporally connected to 
adverse employement actions may not raise a triable issue of fact as to the employer's intent to 
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withstand an employer's motion for summary judgment, it is well settled case law that remarks 
by decisionrnakers about race, age or gender are indicators of discriminatory bias. The strength 
and credibility of such evidence are for the trier of fact to determine. Whether the remarks 
indicate bias depends on the decisionrnaker's meaning, which "may depend on various factors 
including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage." Ash v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454,456 (2006); see also Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919,933-34 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (bigoted remarks by decisionrnaker may tend to show discriminatory intent even if 
directed at someone other than plaintiff). Determining whether the age-biased comments were, 
in fact, innocuous or, in fact, a sign of bias belongs to the jury. Troy v. Standard Ins. Co., 24 
Fed.Appx. 801, 803 (9th Cir. 2001). 
Furthermore, Merrick, one of the cases cited by the University for support of its "stray 
remarks" argument has been limited by the Ninth Circuit. In Schnidrig, 80 F.3d 1406, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the plaintiff did more than offer mere allegations of discriminatory intent; he 
produced evidence in the form of shorthand notes taken at a meeting and the affidavit of a 
coworker. In the end, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court was in error to grant summary 
judgment on the assertion of "stray remarks": 
Although it is possible that [defendant] sufficiently insulated the decision-
making process from the discriminatory remarks of the directors, in light of 
the reluctance of this Circuit to allow summary judgment where there is direct 
or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, the district court was 
premature in resolving this issue on summary judgment. Whether [defendant] 
relied on impermissible factors in refusing to promote [plaintiff] is a question 
appropriately answered by a trier of fact. 
Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1411. 
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The facts in Watennan relating to "stray comments" are also greatly distinguishable from 
the facts of this case. In Watennan, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that there was no evidence 
(of proof offered at trial) that the plaintiff put the comments of a "young company" into context 
to produce evidence of intent behind them.7 In Watennan, the "stray comments" concerning a 
"young company" were made to and from other individuals within the company and not to the 
Plaintiff herself. Moreover, in Watennan there was no discussion of the temporal relationship 
between the "stray comments" and any adverse employment action; in fact, the Court found 
there was not even any adverse action taken. This is extremely different from Ms. Hatheway's 
case because not only was there adverse employment actions taken against Ms. Hatheway, the 
ageist comments were made directly to or around Ms. Hatheway. Although Dr. Olsson did not 
initially state that he wanted a "young and energetic" employee directly to Ms. Hatheway, he 
later admitted and reaffirmed to Ms. Hatheway that he made that comment and that he would not 
consider an older worker. Further, the evidence and facts (as addressed in the Appellant's Brief) 
establish a temporal (nexus) relationship between the comments made by Dr. Olsson and 
President White in relation to the adverse employment actions Ms. Hatheway suffered; therefore, 
Ms. Hatheway's case is distinguishable from Watennan and the University's citation thereof is 
not relevant. 
7 This is in addition to the distinguishable fact that Waterman was not an appellate review of a motion for summary 
judgment, as already pointed out herein. 
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As a result, none of the University's response arguments relative to the evidence Ms. 
Hatheway presented of age discrimination establishes as proper basis for the District Court to 
grant summary judgment. 
D. Ms. Hatheway's Hostile Work Environment and Retaliation Claims survive 
summary judgment because material issues of fact exist as to the working 
conditions and the nexus and/or causation of the adverse employment actions 
and her age discrimination and complaints. 
The University asserts that Ms. Hatheway's hostile work environment and retaliation 
claims fail as a matter of law because: "U of I does not accept Ms. Hatheway's description of the 
workplace environment or claims of retaliation." (Resp. 's Brief, pg. 28) The University does 
not have to accept Ms. Hatheway'S description and evidence produced of the workplace 
environment or claims of retaliation for Ms. Hatheway to be able to survive its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. To survive summary judgment on these two claims, the issue is whether, 
giving all reasonable inferences in favor of Ms. Hatheway, and without making credibility 
determinations, Ms. Hatheway produced enough evidence to create genuine issues of material 
facts through affidavits, deposition testimony, and documents produced to establish genuine 
issues on two disputed facts: (1) whether her working conditions were so intolerable that a 
reasonable female over forty would have felt compelled to resign; and (2) whether there is a 
nexus and/or casual connection between the adverse employment actions she suffered and her 
age and/or complaints of age discrimination. Ms. Hatheway has done so, and the University'S 
conclusion to the contrary does not render summary judgment appropriate. 
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Specifically, the University does not "accept" Ms. Hatheway's evidence on her working 
conditions and the nexus between her age/protected activity and her adverse employment actions 
because: (1) while the University admits that some of Ms. Hatheway's duties and responsibilities 
may have lessoned and shifted away from her, it claims Ms. Hatheway'S job description was 
never modified and she was not demoted; (2) many of the Professors in the Department of 
English were themselves "elderly" and they had not experienced or witnessed the University 
treating someone differently because of age; and that (3) Ms. Hatheway was merely an unhappy 
employee who failed to establish a nexus between her adverse employment actions, including her 
2006 annual evaluation, her PDP, and her 2007 evaluation, and any evidence of age 
discrimination as a motivating factor thereof. 
The University's first argument, that she was not demoted and that her job description did 
not change, is really an argument that Ms. Hatheway did not suffer adverse employment actions. 
The University also makes this same argument in relation to the performance development plan 
(PDP) Ms. Hatheway received when the University falsely claims that it was "not disciplinary in 
any way." In the Ninth Circuit, an adverse employment action has been defined as one that is 
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity. Ray v. Henderson, 217 
F .3d 1234, 1242 43 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, it is clear from Flannery, 160 F .3d 425, cited to in 
the University's Response Brief, that ostracism that results in reduced responsibilities is an 
adverse employment action. Id. at 428. (Resp. 's Brief, pg. 28) 
Thus, whether Ms. Hatheway'S job description was modified, whether she was 
(officially) demoted, and whether the University verbally claims that the PDP was not 
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disciplinary, is not material to the issue of whether she suffered adverse employment actions. 
The question is, whether ostracism coupled with reduced responsibilities, two poor performance 
evaluations, the failure to receive an automatic pay raise, and ageist comments made to Ms. 
Hatheway are reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activities. The 
University admits that she had her responsibilities reduced, that Dr. Olsson failed to follow-up on 
meetings with her, that she was given two performance evaluations with needs improvement, and 
that she did not receive a raise in one of those years. As a result, the evidence, while some 
disputed, creates a genuine issue of material fact that Ms. Hatheway did suffer those adverse 
employment actions. 
Further, in regards to the PDP, as provided in the evidence of the University's own 
policies and procedures, the only time a PDP is allowed to be used is when a classified employee 
is being placed on a 90-day performance-related probation period. Undoubtedly being placed on 
baseless performance-based 90 day probation pursuant to a plain reading of the organization's 
own policies and procedures, after reporting what one perceives to be age discrimination in their 
pay, is an action "reasonably likely to deter employees from" engaging in the protective activity 
of reporting perceived age discrimination. Therefore, the University's first argument on Ms. 
Hatheway's hostile work environment and retaliation claims fails. 
Similarly, the University's second argument that many of the Professors in the 
Department of English were themselves "elderly" and they had not experienced or witnessed the 
University treating someone differently because of age, is irrelevant because the professors were 
not comparators to Ms. Hatheway, an administrative assistant (i.e., such as Ms. Allen and Ms. 
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Carmen), and there is no relevance to the Professors' own personal experiences. Such evidence 
would likely not even be admissible at trial because Ms. Hatheway's claim is the intentional 
discrimination by the University against Ms. Hatheway, and not what others mayor may not 
have experienced at the University. 
Third, the University's allegation that Ms. Hatheway was really just an unhappy 
employee and she failed to prove at the summary judgment stage a nexus and/or casual 
connection between the age discrimination and complaints, with her adverse employment actions 
suffered, does not establish a basis for dismissal of her claims. Again, the University does not 
really dispute that Ms. Hatheway suffered adverse employment actions (except for the PDP), but 
rather attempts to proffer alleged non-discriminatory reasons for its adverse actions taken and 
states that Ms. Hatheway has not "proven" that but for her age, she would not have suffered 
those actions. 
To support this argument the University superficially discussed its basis and/or 
explanations for Ms. Hatheway's 2006 and 2007 performance evaluation, and her performance 
development plan. Ms. Hatheway has already offered the evidence in her Appellant's Brief 
which supports that a reasonable jury can conclude the causation and/or a nexus connection 
between these adverse actions and the false reasons behind them, with Ms. Hatheway's 
complaints of, and age discrimination. Regardless of the undisputed circumstantial evidence of 
the thirty-two (32) year-old whom Dr. Olsson hired to replace Ms. Hatheway; for sake of brevity, 
Ms. Hatheway will not restate each and every fact and piece of evidence which proves the 
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University's proffered reasons false, and supports the nexus and/or causal connection of her 
adverse employment actions with her protected activities. 
Irrespective of the above, at the prima facie stage of a retaliation case, "[t]he causal link 
element is construed broadly so that a plaintiff merely has to prove that the protected activity and 
the negative employment action are not completely unrelated." Poland, 494 F.3d at 1181-82, 
citing Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (lith Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Moreover, as pointed out in the Appellant's Brief, the issue of causation and/or 
nexus is not a question that is generally resolved on a summary judgment motion. The issue of 
whether adverse employment actions were based on protected or unprotected activities, and if 
the University would have taken the adverse actions but for Ms. Hatheway'S protected activities 
and/or age, is a question that can only be resolved by the jury. Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 
1072 (9th Cir. 2009), citing Wagle v. Murray, 560 F.2d 401,403 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that on 
a retaliation claim regarding the causal connection between protected activity and adverse 
employment action, that the "causation inquiry is purely a question of fact."); see also Ennis v. 
Boundary County, 2010 WL 2813361 (D. Idaho July 15,2010). 
Lastly, the University's argument that the non-discriminatory reason for the multiple 
adverse employment actions Ms. Hatheway suffered was because she was an unhappy employee 
who complained, and that she finally did receive a raise after her multiple complaints does not 
establish the propriety of summary judgment. Ms. Hatheway has provided an abundance of 
evidence that she received a raise to which she was entitled only after she pointed out the 
objective criteria used against her was patently false. If Ms. Hatheway would have done what 
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the University of Idaho wanted her to do, i.e., not complain, just be happy, sign the negative 
documents and evaluations against her, and take it, she would not have received the raise she was 
ultimately deemed to be eligible for. The University ultimately called her an "unhappy 
employee," "negative," "uncooperative," "disagrees," and someone who should just "move on" 
for standing up for her legal rights. That is classically retaliatory conduct. This evidence is not 
supportive of legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, but is rather supportive of retaliatory and 
hostile conduct, and evidence of pretext. Therefore, Ms. Hatheway's claims of hostile work 
environment and retaliation must survive summary judgment, and the District Court was wrong 
to dismiss them. 
E. According to the University's own argument in its response brief, Ms. 
Hatheway'S negligent infliction of emotional distress claim automatically 
survives summary judgment because she has brought forth evidence to create 
genuine issues of material fact on her other claims. 
The University ends its response brief on Ms. Hatheway'S negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim by arguing only that: "[b ]because Ms. Hatheway has failed to show a 
material issue of fact on her age discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and 
constructive discharge claims, any emotional distress claim must also fail." (Respo's Brief, pg. 
33) Ms. Hatheway's simple reply to the University's only response argument on this claim is 
that Ms. Hatheway has brought forth evidence in response to the University's Motion for 
Summary Judgment to show material issues of fact on her age discrimination, hostile work 
environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge claims; therefore, according to the 
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University's own logic, Ms. Hatheway's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim must 
necessarily survive summary judgment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, together with the arguments provided in Appellant's Brief, the 
District Court was in error when it granted complete summary judgment on all of Plaintiff-
Appellant Ms. Hatheway'S claims. Thereby, the Idaho Supreme Court should reverse the 
District Court's Order granting the Defendants-Respondents the University of Idaho's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and remand the case back to District Court for trial on the merits of her 
claims. 
DA TED this 29th day of August, 2012. 
SCOi~ 
WINSTON & CASHA IT, LA WYERS, 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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